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STATEHOOD FOR NEW MEXICO, 1888-1912
By ROBERT W. LARSON *

political struggle lasting more than sixty years
preceded New Mexico's 1912 entry into the union of
A
states. As part of that great tract of southwestern territory
FJERCE

ceded by Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, New
Mexico became part of the United States in 1848. On March 3,
1851, she received territorial status. At that time Arizona
comprised the western half, but received separate status in
1863. New Mexico had high hopes for early statehood. An
area rich in resources and vast in acreage her prospects
seemed promising, but discouragement and disappointment
were to be felt many times before the coveted goal was
. achieved.
Many of the more significant events leading to New Mexico's statehood took place in the two decades just before admission. The frontier period of the West had ended and the
modern era was beginning. Populations in all the western
territories were increasing and so was the demand for statehood. In New Mexico there were probably not more than a
thousand residents in the territory in 1850 who had been born
in the United States and the population was then over 65,000.
Thirty-eight years later, in 1888, Spanish-speaking people
still held a majority, but the number of easterners had swelled
the so-called American population considerably. Many of
• Prof. Larson, Colorado State College at Greeley. has summarized his doctoral dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1960, in this article.
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these newcomers who flocked to the territory were farmers,
while others were merchants or traders, not to mention the
railroad men and those interested in mining. Of all who came,
however, the group which was to play one of the most important roles in influencing the course of New Mexico's fight for
statehood proved to be the lawyers-lawyers of varying capabilities, but almost without exception men who had strong
opinions regarding statehood.
Many of the lawyers were quick to see what a vast fortune
could be built in so rich a country. They looked with unrestrained ambition upon the obscure titles of ownership to
thousands of acres in the territory. The original owners of
the land had received their titles under the Spanish and then
Mexican rule which preceded the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Now, with many of the titles to these grants clouded in
doubt after generations during which more and more members of the original family lived on the land, the American
lawyers saw that they could use their legal skill to acquire a
great deal of the land for themselves. Their success in this
endeavor as well as in various other economic enterprises
undertaken over the years was amazing. Because of the constant and close cooperation of these lawyers, their opponents
soon labeled them as members of a "ring." The term generally
referred to the Santa Fe Ring, although there were others of
less importance.
Edmund G. Ross, appointed territorial governor by Grover Cleveland in 1885, showed toward the Santa Fe Ring the
same outspoken courage he had shown in casting a decisive
vote against the removal of Andrew Johnson in 1868. In a
letter to a friend in St. Louis Ross described the rings as the
"curse of this Territory." Quoting an unnamed veteran of the
Mexican war he pictured the land ring as being "composed of
Americans possessed of some legal lore with a large amount
of cheek and an unusual quantity of low cunning and astuteness that always had an inclination to run in a crooked direction." The original grant holders were described as "simple
Mexicans who never would have thought of claiming more
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than their papers called for, but the ring soon taught them a
few tricks they had never thought of." The result of this collaboration was that a number of Americans were given sizeable shares of these grants in return for their legal service.
At the same time, Mexicans were voting the lawyers to Congress, thus giving them "federal as well as territorial power."
The political makeup of the land grant ring, as well as the
many other rings,was bipartisan because "nearly every law
and commercial firm especially the former, contained a Democrat and a Republican, apparently for prudential reasons, so
that whichever side might come uppermost,· the dominant
party was represented, and there was an average of one lawyer for every ten Americans."
The numerical predominance of lawyers gave the Santa
Fe Bar a position of great influence. Its members controlled
and dominated the activities of the Santa Fe Ring which, in
turn, dictated to all lesser rings. Rings were found in towns
throughout the territory, but all were subservient to the "cen'tral head." Ross regarded the Santa Fe Bar as a closed corporation, manipulating the bulk of the territory's legislation.
Facts verify much of what the governor said about the
Santa Fe Ring. Especially revealing were the careers of two
attorneys, Catron and Elkins, whom Ross called the principal
"originators and manipulators" of the land grant ring.
Stephen B. Elkins, the first to come to New Mexico, arrived
in 1865, two years before Catron. As a lawyer he recognized
the necessity of speaking Spanish, and soon became proficient
in that tongue. In 1866 he was elected a member of the lower
house of the territorial legislative assembly, and in 1868
President Andrew Johnson appointed him U. S. Attorney for
New Mexico. From 1873 to 1877 he served as the territory's
delegate to Congress. In that capacity he nearly achieved
statehood in 1875 but Southern Congressmen killed the bill
by reversing their votes when Elkins unwittingly congratulated a Northern senator after he had delivered a bitter political speech dealing with events following the Civil War. Elkins
did succeed in getting a bill through the Senate the next year
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but failed to obtain the support of the House Committee on
Territories.
Elkins had only been in the territory a short time when
he moved to Santa Fe and formed a law partnership with
Thomas B. Catron, an old friend and classmate from the University of Missouri. If any man could be pointed to as the
leader of the Santa Fe Ring that man was Catron. After Elkins left the territory to live in New York he looked to Catron
to represent his economic interests. Catron's name was continually associated with the Ring, and when the Ring was
blamed for certain activities, Catron was often the scapegoat.
A stout man with a gruff manner, he had moved to Santa Fe
in 1867 to practice law. Shortly after his arrival the governor
told him he would be appointed attorney of the third district
if he could learn to speak Spanish. Catron at once moved to
Rio Arriba County where he encountered few English-speaking persons, and learned to speak Spanish fluently in six
months. After receiving the appointment, he continued to
use his newly acquired ability and his legal background to
satisfy his insatiable hunger for land. By 1883 he was one
of the largest land owners in the nation.
Elkins also came to own much land. He was owner of a
sizeable chunk of the large Mora Grant in Northern New
Mexico and was one of the principal owners of the Ortiz
Grant. Catron acquired 240,000 acres of the Mora Grant, taking in most of the northern portion of this extensive tract.
His holdings in the Antonio Ortiz Grant eventually amounted
to a hundred thousand acres. But his biggest holding by far
was the Tierra Amarilla Grant, comprising 593,000 acres of
land located in northern New Mexico and in southern
Colorado.
Another important member of the Ring, despite the fact
that he was often at loggerheads with Catron, was Le Baron
Bradford Prince. Prince, aNew Yorker, was appointed Chief
Justice of New Mexico in 1879, and while serving in that position was accused of being a Ring member. Prince's public
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career was matched by a legal and commercial career in which
he managed to acquire a great deal of land in the territory.
Prince was, however, above all else, an unceasing fighter for
New Mexico statehood. Some have felt that he deserves to be
called "The Father of New Mexico Statehood."
Although Catron, Elkins, and Prince were Republicans,
there were several prominent Democrats active in Ring affairs including two of Catron's law partners, Charles C. Gildersleeve and William C. Thornton. In a memo from Ross'
personal papers, Gildersleeve was accused of heading a clique
of "land grabbers" in which Antonio Joseph, New Mexico's
delegate to Congress in 1884, was a member. Gildersleeve
was alleged to have bought the chairmanship of the Democratic Central Committee and also to have gotten his henchman, Joseph, elected delegate with the help of the Santa Fe
Ring. Gildersleeve was also accused of collaborating with
Catron in buying many native claims to the Ritaca Land
Grant. Antonio Joseph's holdings in the Chama and Ojo Caliente Grants were thought to be largely due to his taking advantage of "poor ignorant Mexicans." Joseph himself was
of native extraction but this did not make him unique among
Ring members. Other native politicians such as J. Francisco
Chaves, Mariano S. Otero, and Pedro Perea had close connections with the Ring.
The Santa Fe Ring was not without stalwart opponents,
and Governor Ross was chief among them. When President
Cleveland refused to withdraw his appointment despite Ring
members' objections, a conspiracy to elect a legislature hostile to the new governor was effectively carried out by the
Santa Fe Ring. The governor was supported in his battle by
such Democratic politicians as Harvey B. Fergusson, and outspoken Democratic newspapers such as the Albuquerque
Morning Democrat and the Socorro Industrial Advertiser.
Native New Mexicans weren't inactive either as indicated
by a secret Catholic Society called the "Association of the
Brotherhood for the Protection of the Rights and Privileges
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of the People of New Mexico" which. vowed its purpose was
"to oppose rings, cliques, monopolies and official corruption
of all kinds."
Despite the efforts of these forces to effectively deter the
Santa Fe Ring, they faced a powerful and vocal opponent in
Max Frost, the editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican, who
acted as spokesman for the Ring. Frost, who was at one time
during his active career indicted in a land fraud prosecution,
effectively used the power of the press to discredit the foes
of the Ring and place the activities of the Santa Fe clique in
the most favorable light. .
The project most dear to the Ring was the acquisition of
statehood. All Ring members, especially Catron, Elkins, and
Prince, were persistent advocates of this step. And their
major motive is not difficult to discern. One need only peruse
the correspondence of Catron. In a letter to J. M. Freeman,
Catron offered to secure a loan of $200,000 with his vast
holdings in the Tierra Amarilla Grant, stating that this property is the "finest large body of land in the arid region of the
United States" and that his "selling price for the same is
three dollars per acre and with the passage of the statehood
bill for New Mexico it will be advanced to not less than $5
per acre." Referring to another tract of land Catron in a second letter opined "if New Mexico is admitted as a State, each
acre of that land would be worth three pesos otherwise it is
not worth more than one now."
As important as this motive was, it does not adequately
explain all the desires of individual Ring members. The leaders of this clique being prominent and influential naturally
had political ambitions, and statehood would mean two senatorships and a representative to the lower house, plus a host
of state officials to be elected. Sensing this, one newspaper,
the Hillsboro Advocate, stated that everyone was opposed to
statehood in southern New Mexico, except for "a few selfseeking politicians;"
The desire for a feeling of equality was no doubt another
important motive. A majority of the Ring members had come
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from eastern states where statehood had been achieved and
they felt that territorial status was a form of second class citizenship. This view was often expressed in their correspondence and public utterances, always louder and longer than
warranted when considered in relation to the economic and
political reasons they probably felt to be more vital to them,
yet were careful to hide from the public.
Whatever the real objectives of the Ring members in so
eagerly desiring statehood for New Mexico, they never left
room for doubt as to their position in this matter. Their policy
was forcibly stated by Frost in the New Mexican when he
wrote: "As long as we obtain statehood we do not care how
it comes or who brings it about. Statehood is what the people
of New Mexico want and statehood they must have in order
to prosper and advance."
Although members of the Santa Fe Ring and various
other rings were almost always supporters of statehood, not
all their opponents were against statehood. On the contrary,
many of them protested their second rate status as vigorously
as Catron or Prince. They were, however, very concerned
about statehood being granted on the "land grabbers" terms,
which they felt would be disastrous for New Mexico. Ross,
for instance, was opposed to immediate statehood because
the territorial legislature had failed to enact an adequate
school bill, and he felt that congressional action must establish a public school system before admission would be wise.
He accused Ring members in general and Catron specifically
of killing the Kistler Bill, which would have established such
a school system. He reasoned that the Ring deliberately
wanted to keep the people ignorant so they could remain in
control. Thus the forces for statehood were divided against
themselves and could not wage an effective battle for a place
of equality in the Union of States.
Despite sentiment for Statehood in New Mexico, action in
that direction did not originate in the territory but rather in
Congress. On March 13, 1888, Congressman William M.
Springer of Illinois, chairman of the Committee on the Terri-
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tories, reported an omnibus bill, H.R. 8466, which would "enable the people of Dakota, Montana, Washington and New
Mexico to form Constitutions and State governments, and to
be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
original States." This was the first serious attempt to admit
a western territory since 1876, when Colorado was granted
statehood.
During the 1880's, prior to the introduction of the Springer
Omnibus Bill, New Mexico had been almost ignored while
the attentionof Congress was directed largely to the struggle
for statehood being waged in Dakota. This was only just because with its rapidly increasing population this area had
the best claim to admission. Congress' preoccupation with
Dakota and a feeling that politically this was the wrong time
to press her cause probably contributed to New Mexico's lack
of initiative during this decade.
Springer in introducing his omnibus bill was doubtlessly
more interested in New Mexico's Democratic leanings than
he was in her cause. New Mexico was the only territory of
the four named in the bill in which Democratic politics had
a chance for success. This assumption was based primarily
upon the election and re-election of a Democratic delegate to
Congress.
Springer's omnibus bill was definitely New Mexico's
brightest chance thus far. For one thing, Dakota's unceasing
demands for statehood could no longer be ignored. It was
assumed that the northwestern territories would all be Republican and that the first act of the next Congress would be
to admit them. With this in mind the Democrats, who controlled the House, were willing to bargain with the Republican Senate. They would remove all opposition to the admission of Dakota, Washington, and Montana, if the Republicans would allow New Mexico into the Union. After the Republican victory at the polls in November, 1888, the Democrats were especially anxious to secure such an agreement.
But New Mexico was not allowed to slip quietly into the
Union. She had been for some time under constant, often
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slanderous attack by a group of eastern and midwestern
newspapers led by the Chicago Tribune. The momentum of
this attack was greatly accelerated after the 1888 Republican success. The attempt to incorporate New Mexico was
looked upon as an eager effort "to secure a couple of Democratic Senators, which will offset the Senators from Dakota.
. . . " The Tribune regarded New Mexico's population as
"not American, but 'Greasers,' persons ignorant of our laws,
manners, customs, language, and institutions." Its attacks on
the territory's statehood aspirations were similar to the ones
frequently uttered by opponents of the Ring, such as the
charge that under state government the greater portion of
the population, being unfamiliar with the English language,
would be at the mercy of "unscrupulous rings of politicians."
Despite the bitter attacks, Springer, a good and loyal
Democrat, remained undaunted. His omnibus bill finally replaced all the separate bills of statehood for Dakota, Montana and Washington. The bill, as finally introduced, was
comparatively short and simple. The provisions pertaining
to New Mexico called for a 75-delegate constitutional conven.tion, empowered to create a full state government. Other provisions dealt with land grants for public schools, land for
the support of public institutions, and land for the establishment of permanent water reservoirs for irrigation. A suggestion that New Mexicans vote on changing the name of New
Mexico to Montezuma brought instant anger from residents
of the territory and a series of resolutions were presented
to the Senate demanding that the old name be kept.
Accompanying the Springer bill were a majority and a
minority report, each of which reached an entirely different
conclusion. The minority report recommended that each territory stand on its own merits rather than be incorporated
into the omnibus bill, and that New Mexico should remain
a territory. Extracts from W. H. H. Davis' El Gringo and
critical reports of such former governors as Lew Wallace
were reprinted. Citizens of New Mexico were pictured as being largely illiterate, superstitious, and morally delinquent.
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Moreover, they were presented as having no desire for
statehood.
The majority report tried to answer this latter charge by
presenting recent newspaper discussion showing that a commanding majority of papers in the territory favored statehood. Statehood memorials and petitions also were presented
by New Mexico's delegate to Congress.
Despite the strong differences of opinion in Congress, the
Springer bill was passed by the House in late January, 1889.
New Mexicans were elated. The Silver City Enterprise confidently predicted that the Senate would follow suit. The legislative assembly passed a memorial requesting statehood and
a statehood convention was held at Santa Fe the same month
as House action.
But only disappointment came when the Republican Senate dropped New Mexico from the bill. Consequently on February 14 the House had to consider the conference report of
the House and the Senate and reconcile differences between
the two bodies. There were three major ones. First, the House
declared for New Mexico, while the Senate opposed inclusion
of that territory. Second, the House wanted to submit the
question of the Dakota's division to her voters while the Senate opposed such an action. And, thirdly, the Senate in order
to prevent delay favored a proclamation by the President to
bring in these northern territories.
The deadlock was finally broken when Congressman Samuel S. Cox of New York offered an amendment proposing
that the House recede from its original position of favoring
New Mexico. The amendment also called for the admission of
South Dakota by presidential proclamation without a new
vote on the question of division. North Dakota, Washington
and Montana also were to be admitted by presidential proclamation. A roll call vote was then taken which would decide
whether New Mexico would be included in the statehood bill.
The result was 134 votes in favor of New Mexico's omission,
105 against, with 84 abstentions.
Prior to the decisive roll call, New Mexico was strongly
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defended in a speech by Antonio Joseph, who argued that the
United States Congress was, at its discretion, obligated under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to admit New Mexico at
an early date. He also contended that statehood was the only
solution for settling the titles of more than 10,000,000 acres
of land in Spanish and Mexican grants.
Opponents, on the other hand, insisted that if the House
did not recede from its position but continued to insist on the
inclusion of New Mexico, it would impair the chances of the
other territories for admittance. Republicans denied any political motives in this regard, asserting that New Mexico's
last two territorial legislatures were heavily Republican. But
Congressman Francis B. Spinola of New York did not believe them. The Republicans would oppose anything which
would have "the least shadow of a tendency" to strengthen
the Democrats. He also accused statehood opponents of trying
to prevent New Mexico's admission because of the religious
opinions of a large number of its inhabitants.
The Democratic Party had held out for New Mexico as its
lone hope for partisan advantage, but when it realized that
the jig was up it surrendered and the four northwestern territories minus New Mexico were admitted into the Union on
February 22, 1889.
Although the Springer bill had failed to secure statehood
for New Mexico it did clarify various shades of opinion in
the territory. The local press, led by the Santa Fe New Mexican, was entirely favorable to the statehood movement. According to the New Mexican, the two strongest local objections to statehood seemed to be the increased taxation which
supposedly would accompany the increased expenses brought
by statehood, and fear that native people would control the
state.
During the congressional proceedings it had been suggested at least twice that New Mexico was not interested in
statehood because her people had not made the effort to draft
a constitution to present Congress for inspection. To remedy
this situation the territorial council on February_ 28, 1889,
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authorized a convention in September to draft such a document. The bill, introduced by Colonel George Pritchard, an
influential Republican from San Miguel County, provided for
7.3 delegates to be apportioned among the counties of the
territory.
No sooner had the bill been introduced when it became
the center of a lively partisan controversy. Democratic leaders attacked 'the bill's apportionment provision, which they
felt gave too much representation to Republican counties.
Governor Ross allowed the bill to reach the statute books
without his signature, but other Democratic leaders remained
adamant and a deadlock soon developed. Despite attempts by
leaders of both parties to achieve a compromise, Democratic
cooperation was not secured, and the Democratic Central
Committee on June 22, 1889, attacked the "inequalities of
representation" and expressed fear regarding the effect of
Republican apportionment on the political complexion of the
new state legislature.
Although the Republican party tried to insert a note of
nonpartisanship into the election of convention delegates,
lack of Democratic cooperation led to a very small vote in the
territory. The vote was so inconsequential in Las Vegas that
the Las Vegas Daily Optic predicted that any constitution
drafted by the convention would not be carried if left to a
vote of the people. Nonetheless, a number of prominent territorial political figures were elected to the convention, including Catron, Frank Springer, Bernard S. Rodey, Pedro Perea,
and Judge L. S. Trimble, the lone Democrat. J. Francisco
Chaves of Valencia County was elected to preside over the
convention.
The convention assembled on September 3, and immediately went to work to frame a suitable instrument of govern:.
ment for the territory. Twelve committees were organized to
handle such topics as the legislative and executive departments, the judiciary, a Bill of Rights, and election procedures.
The establishment of a secular school system was perhaps the knottiest of the convention's problems. The Roman
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Catholic Church had enjoyed a position of primacy in this
field and naturally looked with suspicion toward any incursions in this sphere. The Most Reverend J. B. Salpointe, Archbishop of Santa Fe, demanded a system of elementary schools
which would give "citizens of the territory, of every shade
of belief, equal facility to educate their children in a manner
they believe will conduce to bring about their happiness."
Whether the archbishop's statement was a plea for a
measure of church control in educational affairs or a hint for
state support of church schools was not made clear; but,
whatever its intention it was totally ignored. Instead, a school
clause was enacted in which a system of public schools was
established "under the absolute control of the state, and free
from sectarian or church control; and no other or different
schools shall ever receive any aid or support from public
funds." One observer wrote Prince that he could name a hundred people who would stick to the Church on the school question: Yet all the native delegates supported the school clause.
There are several apparent reasons for the strong school
clause. Undoubtedly there was strong pressure from the
"anglo" population, imbued as it was with the tradition of
separation of Church and State. An article appearing in the
New York Tribune a month or so after the convention revealed another reason. The delegates to the constitutional
convention were writing a constitution as much for the eyes
and approval of the rest of the nation as for the people of
their territory. They were very conscious of the many
charges by outsiders that the new state government would
be unduly influenced by the priesthood.
Opposition to the new constitution in the territory was
largely caused by the school provision, but there were other
kinds of opposition. Antonio Joseph, on the floor of Congress,
attacked the apportionment of delegates to the convention as
an act of "outrageous partisanship." He pointed out that of
32,000 voters in New Mexico only 7,000 participated in the
election of convention delegates. Joseph's stand could only be
explained in terms of politics. Economically he had a great
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deal to gain by immediate statehood, as his landholdings and
Ring affiliation would testify.
Democratic sniping soon had its effect. One proponent of
the constitution, former Governor Axtell, later asserted that
while in Washington he had been told in so many words to
submit the constitution to the people for ratification, after
which the territory would be admitted if the people gave their
approval. Consequently, on August 18, 1890, a meeting of
convention delegates was held and October 7; rather than the
regular election day in November, was set for a vote on the
constitution by the people.
Lively controversy preceded the October 7 vote. Supporters of the constitution were accused by having made an instrument which would further their own "land grabbing"
inclinations by allowing the land grant holder to almost completely escape taxation. The Socorro Industrial Advertiser
warned of future Ring control and charged that because of
unscrupulous manipulation assessments on large land grants
would be kept down to one-tenth of their value, and taxes
would be kept small by a constitutional limit of one percent
on taxable property.
But the most explosive issues by far were the apportionment and public school provisions. Despite the fact that convention delegates at the August 18 meeting had amended the
education article to make only a vague and general reference
abOut raising adequate school taxes, opposition was still
lively. An alarmed Catron in discussing the school issue
wrote Senator William Stewart of Nevada that "many of the
priests of the Catholic Church have been delivering sermons
against it [the constitution]." Democrats were accused of
using this issue to turn the Spanish-speaking people-of the
territory against the proposed instrument.
The result was a convincing defeat for the Constitution
of 1889. The vote was 16,180 against and only 7,493 in favor.
Governor Prince, fearful of adverse reaction in Washington,
forcefully denied that this vote was any indication of a "dis-
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inclination on the part of the people to assume the condition
of statehood."
Defeat of the Constitution embittered Republicans and
undoubtedly weakened the statehood movement. The admission of Idaho and Wyoming the following year, however,
brought Prince back into the fray. "We have a greater population than Wyoming and Idaho combined and in wealth and
natural resources surpass either of these states."
During the next few years, Delegate Joseph was more active than anyone else as he introduced a number of statehood
bills. Among the factors responsible for the ultimate failure
of these bills was the fact that many easterners, including
President Cleveland, blamed the Panic of 1893 on the drain
of gold reserves caused by "cheap" silver. New Mexico's silver sentiments did not endear her with this faction. Joseph's
alleged obstinancy may have weakened statehood chances,
too. In 1893 during House debate on H.R. 353 Joseph was
pressed to incorporate into the bill the phrase: ". . . in all
of which public schools the English language shall be taught."
Joseph objected vigorously because this suggestion had been
made 7 or 8 years ago and since that time the educational system had been expanded so that English was taught in each of
the 619 public schools in the territory.
The failure of Joseph's last statehood bill was not only a
setback for the statehood movement but it probably cost
Joseph his re-election as well. Having served the territory as
delegate for ten years, he based his campaign almost exclusively upon the statehood issue. His Republican opponent,
Catron, campaigned for the restoration of protective tariffs
on wool and mining products, and won handily in the 1894
electi,On.
Catron's one term as territorial delegate was not a particularly satisfying or successful one, despite his many connections in the Senate and his unceasing, energetic work for
statehood. The silver question was now sweeping the country,
and most New Mexicans did not find Catron's moderate views
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on this issue pleasing. A conservative, high tariff Republican,
Catron was inclined to oppose the free and unlimited coinage
of silver, while New Mexico was definitely a "free silver"
territory. Despite the fact that he did everything in his power
to make statehood and tariff the chief issues in the territorial
election of 1896, free silver could not be totally erased from
the minds of New Mexicans. Th~ Democrats nominated Harvey B. Fergusson, an unequivocal advocate of free silver, who
eventually received the support of the territorial Populist
Party. Catron's reputation suffered too as he was vigorously
attacked by opponents for his Ring connections. Criticism
even reached Congress, where letters from New Mexicans accused Catron and Elkins, now a senator from West Virginia,
of land grabbing. Consequently, it was no shock when Fergusson triumphed in the territorial delegate race.
Fergusson's serious handicap as delegate was that he
went to Washington as a Democrat during a Republican
year. Nonetheless, he was loyal to the cause, introducing two
unsuccessful statehood bills during his term in Congress. He
did secure the passage of two significant laws. The first was
a measure which permanently located the capitol of the territory at Santa Fe. The second was the famous land law of 1898
which paved the way for New Mexico's admission into the
Union.
The land measure, called the Fergusson Act, gave the Territory of New Mexico immediately, before admission, sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 of every township for educational purposes. In addition, 100,000 acres of land were granted for
educational and other public purposes. Ordinarily such
grants were conferred only upon admission, but the operations ot'the recently created Court of Private Land Claims
had opened up for public entry thousands of acres of land on
Spanish and Mexican grants which would be taken quickly if
the school system were not provided for immediately. After
submission to·the Committee on Public Lands the Act was
reported favorably, but altered to grant only 2 land sections
from each township.
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During Fergusson's term as delegate, a new governor was
chosen in the territory. Miguel Otero's unexpected appointment by President McKinley ushered in a new era in New
Mexico politics. Catron, the old Republican boss, now faced a
real challenge. Although he had strongly supported Pedro
Perea of Bernalillo rather than Otero, Catron at first accepted
the President's decision with little complaint. But soon the
independent "Little Governor," as Otero was called, began to
aggravate Catron, and Republicans in the territory were
forced to take sides in the bitter feud that followed. Most of
the young political leaders-Colts as they were called-threw
in their lot with Otero.
The feud had special significance for the statehood campaign. The election of Catron's close friend, Perea, over Fergusson in 1898, placed the new delegate right in the middle
of the crossfire. Otero, recognizing him as a Catron man, opposed and later dismissed his term in Congress as a donothing one. Perea in turn accused the governor of working
against him. The result was that little was accomplished at
this time in the struggle for statehood.
Perea was succeeded by Bernard S. Rodey, whose persistent, driving personality lent strength to any cause he
undertook. In alliance with Otero the two men silenced almost
completely all opposition to statehood which had existed in
the territory since the failure of the Constitution of 1889. It
became unpatriotic, to say the least, to be anything but enthusiastically for New Mexico statehood. "Every man who
doesn't want statehood is our enemy," warned Rodey. He was
backed by the New Mexican which again took leadership in
the statehood movement. Of two thousand bills introduced in
the house the first day of the new session Rodey's statehood
measure was number two. This dynamic approach continued
throughout his term as delegate.
Other developments seemed to favor New Mexico's cause.
Roosevelt's succession to the presidency after McKinley's
death was regarded as significant. Otero had earned the new
president's gratitude by extending complete cooperation in
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raising Roosevelt's beloved Rough Rider regiments in New
Mexico. During the first Rough Rider reunion at Las Vegas
in June, 1899, Roosevelt, who was then governor of New
York, promised his full support if New Mexico wanted to become a state.
Economic developments at the start of the twentieth century were also important. The depressed conditions which
had produced such movements as Free Silver and Populism
had also caused great suffering in New Mexico. The important industries-railroads, mining, and cattle-were at a low
ebb as the result of a series of depressions during the eighties
and nineties. By 1900 a gradual revival of these industries
had begun; The population, which had been declining, started
to rise again. Optimism soon replaced gloom. The change was
generally regarded as a good omen for statehood.
New Mexicans once again actively pushed their cause. A
statehood convention in 1901 passed a series of resolutions
at the governor's request. But far more important was the
introduction of H.R. 12543, an omnibus statehood bill bearing the name of William S. Knox of Massachusetts, chairman
of the House Committee on the Territories. Rodey took credit
for having convinced the delegates of Arizona and Oklahoma
that their only chance for statehood within the near future
lay in combining their resources with New Mexico and making the fight together.
The House began consideration of the Knox Bill on May 7,
1902. "Praise the Lord from whom all blessings flow" telegraphed an enthusiastic Rodey. Only two days of debate were
consumed before the House passed the measure. With the
prestige of Knox's committee chairmanship behind it, influential Republicans as well as Democrats backed the bid. Knox
pointed to the affirmative stand on statehood in both party
platforms and emphasized the bipartisan aspect of the movement. But perhaps the most interesting development during
debate was the proposal by Jesse Overstreet of Indiana to
admit Arizona and New Mexico as one state to be called
Montezuma. It was argued that this would bring the two ter-
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ritorles into the Union on such a basis as would make their
representation in Congress bear some fair relation to their
population.
When the bill reached the Senate, the figure of Senator
Albert J. Beveridge cast an ominous shadow. The Indianan
had been appointed chairman of the Senate Committee on
Territories in December, 1901, following a colorful career in
the upper house which began in 1889. His enthusiastic advocacy of American imperialism had brought him into close
communion with President Roosevelt and other expansionists. His oratorical ability had given him national reputation.
The Senator also had positive ideas on statemaking. The creation of a new state was to him of paramount concern because
once admitted the act could· not by constitutional arrangement be rescinded.
Although he was deluged by letters from citizens in the
territories asking that favorable action be taken on the omnibus measure, Beveridge was very hesitant because of the unusual concern for New Mexico shown by certain corporate
interests. He was especially curious as to why one of his committee members, Matthew S. Quay, was so deeply interested.
Quay was a shrewd and unscrupulous politician who dominated politics in Pennsylvania as if the state were his personal bailiwick. During Cleveland's second administration
he had admittedly speculated in sugar stocks while manipulating the sugar schedule of the Wilson-Gorman tariff. Consequently, when Quay tried to discharge the Committee on
Territories from further consideration of the Knox Bill on
June 23, Beveridge balked.
Despite Quay's insistence that the bill be considered by
the Senate immediately, he was finally forced to withdraw
his demand when it was agreed unanimously that the bill
should be taken up on December 10 and made the regular
order of unfinished business until disposed of by the upper
chamber.
Beveridge determined to precede any further debate of
the Knox Bill with a thorough on-the-spot investigation of
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the territories. With the clever Quay as an adversary he believed extensive documentation would be necessary. Despite
assertions to the contrary his investigation was not to be an
impartial one. Beveridge had close friends in the journalistic
fraternity and through them he hoped to influence public
opinion. For instance, he wanted Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of
the Review of Reviews, to contact university professors who
by their experiences could testify as to "the soil, its aridity,
the impossibility of further population till irrigation shall
have done its work[,] and the character of the present population" of the southwest territories.
The investigation began when Beveridge's committee of
three, accompanied by a staff of stenographers and interpreters, held its first hearing in East Las Vegas, New Mexico,
on Wednesday, November 12. As the group continued on to
Albuquerque, Las Cruces, and Santa Fe, most New Mexicans
presented a fairly united front in favor of statehood, although one volunteer witness, Martinez Amador, claimed native New Mexicans were not ready for statehood yet "because
most of the people here is [sic] ignorant."
Arizona and Oklahoma were also visited on the "flying
trip." More than a third of the witnesses questioned in Arizona were census enumerators who were asked about nationalities in the territory and the need for interpreters. The
aridity of the soil and provisions for irrigation were also a
source of interest to the committee. In Oklahoma the major
line of questioning pertained to the willingness of the Oklahoma and Indian Territories to unite and seek admission as
a single state.
.
Beveridge continued to be suspicious of Quay, attributing
the Pennsylvanian's interest in New Mexico to a desire to
help an old friend and lieutenant, William H. Andrews, secure a seat in the U. S. Senate and sell bonds for a new railroad being built in New Mexico. Andrews, having been
retired from office by the voters of his Pennsylvania county,
had moved to New Mexico to pursue an interest in gold mining. Later he became involved in railroading and the result
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was the Santa Fe Central Railway, of which "Bull" Andrews
was made president. Capital for the railroad was supplied
by a group of Pennsylvania investors headed by W. H. Torrance, and a Sierra county cattleman, Willard S. Hopewell.
The road, which was completed in December, 1903, stretched
116 miles from Torrance to Santa Fe. According to the Chicago Tribune the road was part of a syndicate which wanted
to see statehood for both territories because if it came the
railway would be assisted by the two new states "to the
amount of $15,000,000." The bonds of the railroad would also
be sold "for several points higher."
When Congress convened in December, 1902, Beveridge
was ready with the majority report of the committee which
recommended that Oklahoma and the Indian Territory be admitted as one state, but that statehood for New Mexica and
Arizona be withheld indefinitely. His major objection to the
latter territories was that they lacked sufficient population to
become states. Other criticisms were that a majority of people in New Mexico were Spanish, and a large percentage
could speak only their native tongue. Illiteracy was high, and
the arid conditions of the southwest imposed serious limitations on agriculture.
Quay and the Democratic minority submitted separate reports which did not allow Beveridge's conclusions to go unchallenged. Territorial papers joined in an attack on the Senator's methods of investigation. The Optic criticized the
closed-door procedure used by Beveridge and likened his refusal to receive voluntary statements to the course of a paid
lawyer trying to secure evidence to justify an argument.
Quay, confident that he had enough support, called for a
vote on the Knox Bill the day after the Beveridge Report was
given. But Beveridge was able to hold off the vote until after
Christmas vacation. When the holiday recess. was over he
began a three months filibuster described by the New York
Evening Post as the "longest continuous hold-up in the history of the country." Beveridge cleverly used his supporters
in relays to keep the filibuster going continually. His backers
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constituted the power block in the Senate and included such
men as Nelson Aldrich, Henry Cabot Lodge, Mark Hanna,
and Knute Nelson.
Quay did not stand alone in his fight to admit the territories, but was ably supported by such Republicans as Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio and Senator Elkins. Foraker
had a brother, a former New Mexico stockman who was now
United States Marshal for the territory, and this may have
been one of his reasons for supporting the omnibus measure.
He contended, however, that he was just being true to the
Republican platform of 1900 which pledged the admission
of the remaining territories. The Democratic minority was
almost unanimously in favor of statehood. Conspicuous
among this group was Henry M. Teller of Colorado, the "Defender of the West."
On March 4, 1903, Congress adjourned without taking
action on the Knox Bill, despite the fact that Quay had made
a total of twenty-seven motions to secure action on the matter. Beveridge had successfully used every parliamentary device possible to keep the issue from coming to a vote. He had
even hidden secretly in Gifford Pinchot's home for a week
knowing that no vote could be taken unless he, as chairman
of the Committee on Territories, was present.
During the lengthy proceedings, joint statehood for the
two southwestern territories was again considered, but rejected, as a compromise measure. Yet the strength for this
movement did not subside. There were strong motives behind
the effort. The East had long been jealous of the growing political power of the West. Admission of New Mexico, Arizona,
Oklahoma, and Indian Territory separately would mean eight
new western senators. In addition, western tendencies to accept radical ideas such as Free Silver and Populism made this
area suspect. Easterners saw no reason to give the West any
more power than necessary, and consolidation of territories
would limit new representation.
Joint statehood as a solution was definitely not the result
of any desire on the part of residents of Arizona and New
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Mexico. Each territory had pressed for statehood but always
single statehood. There was no animosity between the two
areas, but rather a lack of mutual interests. New Mexico in
her business and trade relations faced east, while Arizona
faced west.
One of the first important territorial figures in New Mexico to be converted to jointure was her congressional delegate,
Bernard Rodey. Rodey had reached the conclusion that separate statehood was impossible, and that joint statehood was
better than remaining a territory. "I am going to agree to
jointure, if terms are favorable and we can get it."
Rodey's support was timely, for two months later on April
1, 1904, Edward L. Hamilton, chairman of the House Committee on Territories, introduced a bill providing for the admission of Oklahoma and Indian Territory as one state, and
Arizona and New Mexico as another. The latter two were to
come into the Union under the name Arizona with the capital
at Santa Fe. The bill, a Republican measure, passed the House
on April 19, and was sent to the Senate the following day. But
when Congress adjourned a week later no action had yet been
taken.
Territorial politicians largely remained opposed to jointure, although many of them like Catron might have gained
financially by the acquisition of statehood. Catron estimated
that the value of his immense land holdings would double six
months after admission. Yet he and Otero agreed for once in
their belief that New Mexico must have single statehood.
Otero broke with Rodey saying jointure was neither acceptable nor desirable.
The following year jointure was again considered in the
Senate, and this time the audacious Foraker offered an
amendment requiring a separate referendum on the matter
in each territory. Thus, jointure could not become law without the consent of both New Mexico and Arizona. This was
to have a significant bearing on the future of jointure.
Meanwhile New Mexico politics were far from peaceful.
The split between Otero and Rodey over jointure and other
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political matters led Otero to support Andrews in the next
election. Although Andrews defeated Rodey in 1904, Otero's
political career was damaged by the chaos and bitter feuding
within the Republican party. To restore harmony President
Roosevelt requested Otero's resignation in terms that could
not be refused and the governor acceded.
New Mexico's fortunes were to be affected adversely by
Andrews' election as delegate. Before he had completed a year
in office, Andrews was blamed for a $300,000 shortage found
in the Enterprise National Bank of Allegheny, Pennsylvania.
In a suicide note left by the bank cashier it was claimed that
funds were advanced to Andrews to finance the Santa Fe Central Railway. The revelation brought about an investigation
and a suit for $52,000 against Andrews for money the delegate allegedly received. The Pittsburgh Post had no doubt
about his guilt and felt that the incident would "materially
affect the whole action of congress on the question of making
new states."
An even more serious threat to jointure than Andrews'
character was the bitter and vocal opposition of Arizonans
to jointure. Beveridge, now an enthusiastic advocate of jointure, was especially angered by Arizona Governor J. H. Kibbey's opposition. "Does it not . . . appear to you that it
would be well for the governors of these territories to keep
their hands off this question which is a policy affecting the
nation?" he wrote Roosevelt. Arizonans were even able to
convince a group of touring congressmen led by Representative James A. Tawney of Minnesota that jointure was not for
Arizona.
Despite these efforts to obstruct joint-statehood, the
jointure campaign opened with real force during the 59th
Congress. On December 5, 1905, President Roosevelt recommended jointure in his presidential message to Congress.
Although this action was attributed to the President's love
of the West, he later wrote a friend: "The only reason I want
them in as one state now is that I fear the alternative is having them as two states three or four years hence."
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Senator Foraker urged that his amendment calling for
a separate referendum in each territory be adopted. Beveridge, fearing the power of special interests in Arizona,
violently opposed the Foraker amendment declaring that it
would give 10,000 people in Arizona an opportunity to control
the destinies of 300,000 to 400,000 people in both territories.
He reasoned that there were only 21,000 voters in Arizona,
and because it was impossible to get all registered ones to
the polls, 10,000 could determine the outcome of jointure.
There were 10,000 men employed by the powerful Copper
Queen Mining Company alone.
The Indiana Senator firmly believed that Arizona's opposition to jointure was inspired by "nothing in the world except a desire to escape taxation." To a certain extent this was
the case in both New Mexico and Arizona. A very light tax
burden was carried by railroad companies in the two territories. Mining companies were under assessed. Arizona cattle
barons, realizing that the public domain which they had long
used would be affected with statehood, already had sent an
anti-jointure memorial to Congress. Lumber barons in New
Mexico opposed statehood because their large land holdings,
such as those in Valencia and McKinley counties, were assessed at less than one-tenth their true value.
There were, however, reasons for opposing jointure that
could not be categorized as strictly selfish. New Mexico's
population in 1900 was 195,310, certainly sufficient to warrant separate statehood. The contrast between New Mexico's
predominantly Spanish-speaking population and Arizona's
"anglo" majority would create an incompatible combination.
Proponents of jointure felt that together the territories
would balance each other by supplying a variety of minerals,
farm produce, and land. The tax burden although greater
would be shared by more people, and the number of state officials would be only half as many as in single statehood, thus
the people would pay fewer salaries.
Senate action on joint statehood during the 59th Congress
led to a deadlock between the House and the Senate. The Sen-
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ate surprisingly chose to eliminate all mention of New Mexico and Arizona in the bill; the House held to the original
proposition. A conference of House and Senate leaders in
June, 1906, resulted in the Carter Compromise. Whereas the
Foraker proposal allowed the people of Arizona and New
Mexico to vote as separate territories at a special election
solely on the question of consolidation, the compromise
amendment suggested that each territory should not only
vote on the jointure question but should at the same time
choose candidates for a constitutional convention and elect
officers for the proposed state. It was hoped that candidates
for state offices would influence voters to support joint statehood.
Expediency was the key word in describing the attitude
of New Mexico Republican leaders. Prior to the enactment
of the Carter Compromise, newspapers. such as the New
Mexican and the Optic were hostile to jointure. But four days
after the Carter Compromise Max Frost, editor of the New
Mexican, declared that his paper was now strongly in favor
of jointure. This was significant because on March 9, 1906,
two very prominent Republicans, Holm O. Bursum and Solomon Luna, had purchased 18,750 shares of capital stock in
the New Mexico Printing Company which published the New
Mexican. Perhaps the strategy of Republican leaders was
best expressed by Major W. H. H. Llewellyn, Republican and
Rough Rider friend of Roosevelt, during the debate over the
Hamilton bill. If the Foraker amendment is adopted, he advised, Arizona will vote the jointure proposal down and then
New Mexico can make her demand for separate status. Thus
the full burden of opposing the administration-sponsored
jointure measure would be borne by Arizona, while New
Mexico would support the measure and be admitted later on
the basis of her loyalty to the national administration..
Once the party had committed itself to jointure its problem was to win the backing of party workers and a majority
of voting citizens in the territory. Bursum, as chairman of
the Republican Central Committee, carried on correspond-
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ence with New Mexico leaders and prominent citizens urging
their support. Frost, through the New Mexican, hoped to convince the average citizen by blanketing the territory with
pro-union literature.
Bursum's efforts were hampered because of a bitter feud
between him and the new territorial governor, Herbert J.
Hagerman. Bursum believed that Hagerman was opposed to
the re-election of Andrews, and equated this resistance with
opposition to the jointure movement. This was unfair for as
the Albuquerque Morning Journal reported, the governor
used every spare moment to campaign for statehood.
Jointure men were at a great disadvantage in Arizona
where the two major parties were united in opposition to
joint statehood. At both party conventions, held September
6,1906, in Bisbee, jointure men found their efforts thwarted.
Pro-jointure delegations were refused recognition, while contesting delegations pledged against joint statehood were
seated.
When voting day finally arrived, on November 6, 1906,
Arizona surprised no one by· killing the jointure proposal
with a convincing vote of 16,265 to 3,141. New Mexicans,
however, responding to pressure from Republican leaders
approved the proposed union by a vote of 26,195 to 14,735.
Only northern counties like Santa Fe, Taos, Rio Arriba, Sierra and Union recorded majorities against it, probably reflecting the opposition of Catron and Otero. But consolidation
efforts were not a complete failure as Oklahoma and the Indian Territory accepted jointure. This resulted in Oklahoma's
admission into the Union on November 16, 1907.
New Mexicans were not particularly disappointed as
they had rather expected a negative vote in Arizona. New
Mexico's acceptance of jointure could only be interpreted as
a victory for Bursum and the territorial Republican organization. But in the delegate race there was cause for concern,
as Andrews squeaked by his Democratic opponent, Octavhino
A. Larrazola, by the narrow vote of 22,915 to 22,649.
There were charges of irregular procedure and actual dis-
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honesty, but efforts for a new referendum were soon dropped.
Even Senator Beveridge seemed willing to concede that jointure as a movement was dead. The question remaining then
was whether the two ill-fated territories would soon have
another opportunity for admission.
Notwithstanding relief on the part of many that the
jointure attempt had failed, pessimism characterized the
thinking of most New Mexicans. The Albuquerque Morning
Journal quoted an unnamed senator who declared that no
other conditions for statehood would be considered except
jointure. Moreover Beveridge still remained adamant in his
attitude toward New Mexico and Arizona, believing that
their populations would never fully entitle them to four
senators.
Especially detrimental to future statehood prospects were
the New Mexico land fraud cases of 1907 which culminated in
the much publicized Hagerman Affair. As a reform governor,
Hagerman was appointed with the idea that as an outsider
he would not be aligned with any of the factions that had
been formed as a result of Otero's feuds with Hubbel, Rodey,
and Catron. Roosevelt had given Hagerman a free hand to
deal with leaders of the territorial "machine." But when Hagerman removed Bursum from his job as superintendent of
the state penitentiary for "inefficient and irregular" administration, he was severely criticized by many including Max
Frost of the New Mexican. From that time on, the governor's
reform movement was greatly weakened, as his political enemies included such potent figures as Delegate Andrews,
Major Llewellyn, and Wallace Raynolds, secretary of the territory. Democrats, needless to say, did all they could to widen
the breach.
Enemies of the new chief executive received their opportunity for revenge when Hagerman delivered land deeds to
the Pennsylvania Development Company. The Fergusson Act
contained a section which restricted the sale of public lands
to one quarter section per individual, corporation, or association. In 1901, "Bull" Andrews, on behalf of himself and his
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associates, wished to buy some ten thousand acres of timberland in Valencia County at three dollars per acre. After his
offer was refused by the Board of Public Lands, it was suggested that he arrange to have various individuals file applications for the land, each person asking for not more than
one quarter section. This was done by Andrew's friend, W. S.
Hopewell, who represented the Pennsylvania Development
Company, a corporation made up of Pennsylvania politicians
and capitalists. Much land was acquired in this fashion by
employees of the Pennsylvania Development Company, the
Santa Fe Central Railway, or the New Mexico Fuel and Iron
Company, corporations apparently under the control of the
same men. Deeds for the property were recorded in the Territorial Land Office but not delivered to the applicants. In August of 1906, Hopewell asked Hagerman to give him the
deeds, which he did, accepting for them a check totaling about
$11,000.
Although Andrews was a principal figure in this affair,
he was among the opponents of Hagerman who used this
episode to discredit the governor. Had Hagerman not consummated a transaction which was clearly fraudulent? Was
his action not in violation of the Fergusson Act? On March 4,
1907, the territorial legislature passed a resolution charging
Hagerman with misconduct in the Pennsylvania Development Company matter. This report eventually reached the
President and put Hagerman in a very bad light. Meanwhile
Andrews was doing everything he could in Washington to
make it appear that unless the Governor were removed he
would ruin the Republican party in New Mexico. Hagerman
was called to Washington to explain his position and, on
April 13, 1907, the day after his arrival, was asked by the
President to submit his resignation.
Hagerman had to accede to the President's request, but
he conducted a stout defense of his position in a series of long
letters which passed between him and the President. He
maintained that his reason for turning over the deeds to
Hopewell was to secure compensation for valuable timber
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already cut. But the assistant attorney general, Alvord W.
Cooley, advised the President that this was unnecessary. The
territory had "ample power under the .statutes to proceed
either civilly or criminally" to recover the value of the timber
cut. Actually there is evidence of political expediency in Hagerman's removal. The President had remarked to a friend,
"Hargerman is a good fellow, but has made an impossible
Governor." Hagerman's father wrote Elihu Root on April
27, 1907, saying that Major Llewellyn had "stated to several
reputable men that he knew . . . six weeks before that the
President would remove Hagerman. . . ." Moreover, George
Curry, Hagerman's successor, admitted later that the governorship was tendered to him as early as February, 1907.
Unquestionably Hagerman was a political liability, but
Roosevelt was highly sensitive to hints that he had been unfair or discriminating. He dispatched two attorneys from the
Department of Justice, Ormsby McHarg and Peyton Gordon,
to investigate the situation. The two men .proved extremely
energetic, bringing suit against a number of corporations allegedly involved in the illegal purchase of lands and timber
from the territory. Newspapers in the territory were soon
attacking the two investigators as friends of the "late, fake
reform ex-governor."
When McHarg almost vindicated Hagerman by ordering
distribution of the money received from the Pennsylvania
Development Company, Roosevelt took decisive action. Curry
was furious and threatened to resign. Consequently the two
agents were instructed by the President to complete their
investigation the following month and turn all unfinished
business over to Captain David H. Leahy, appointed to succeed Major Llewellyn as United States District Attorney.
Moreover, nineteen indictments, which had been brought in
connection with alleged fraudulent coal land entries uncovered in the investigation, were eventually dropped. Both men
were quite unhappy, with McHarg becoming a rather outspoken critic of the President.
Curry's friendship with Roosevelt, dating back to their
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Rough Rider days, prompted the Albuquerque Citizen to interpret his appointment as presidential willingness to at last
support single statehood. But Roosevelt told Curry that "before you can get statehood you must clean house in New Mexico. . . ." Despite the President's admonition, New Mexicans
had reason to be pleased the following year when the National
Republican Convention included for the first time an unequivocal statehood pledge in the party platform. On December
8, 1908, Roosevelt recommended separate statehood, saying:
"This should be done at the present session of Congress." In
response to his call a bill for separate admission of New Mexico and Arizona passed the House unanimously on February
15 and was sent to the Senate.
In the upper house, Beveridge made use once again of .
every detrimental piece of evidence available in a last stand
against New Mexico and Arizona. The land fraud scandal
was sprung during hearings of his committee, and derogatory
statements made by McHarg and Hagerman were submitted
with effectiveness. The 60th Congress and Roosevelt's term
both ended with no statehood for New Mexico.
Taft, anxious to please his predecessor, had no idea of deserting the statehood cause although New Mexicans were
rather fearful before his inauguration. It soothed their worries when Representative Hamilton, still chairman of the
House territorial committee, introduced on January 14,1910,
H.R. 18166, a bill to enable the people of New Mexico and Arizona to form separate governments and be admitted into the
Union. New Mexico was permitted two representatives to the
lower house and was to receive two sections of nonmineral
land in each township in addition to the two previously
granted for common schools under the Fergusson Act.· Approximately 3,000,000 acres of nonmineral land for the payment of valid debts would be granted the new state.
Although the Outlook, a magazine supporting Beveridge,
brought up the old, time-worn argument that New Mexico's
insufficient population did not entitle her to statehood, Beveridge himself was tiring of the long campaign. The party
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platform, the stand of the Taft administration, and the vote
on jointure all made further opposition seem quite futile.
Beveridge accepted the inevitable, but determined to push a
statehood measure free of "jokers" hurting the people's interests. Thus the Hamilton bill, having already passed the
House, was reported favorably by his committee, but altered
by an amendment which left nothing of the original bill except the enacting clause.
The generous land provisions were cut drastically and the
process of constitution-making was placed under the close
supervision of the federal government. For the first time a
new state was required to return its ratified constitution to
both the President and Congress for final approval. Rigid
safeguards on the disposal of public land were inserted in the
amended bill, no doubt reflecting suspicion caused by the land
fraud scandal.
The Senate version of the bill represented the eastern
viewpoint to a greater degree than had the original House
measure. Whereas the House bill permitted the teaching of
languages other than English, the Senate version provided
that schools should be conducted in English only. State legislators as well as state officers were required to read, write and
understand the English language well enough not to need interpreters. A more stringent polygamy restriction was incorporated because of fear of Mormonism, particularly in
Arizona Territory.
New Mexicans naturally disliked the Senate version, but
saw no alternative but to support it. Bursum wrote Beveridge: "I have told our friends down here that New Mexico
will obtain statehood by the grace and good offices of Senator Beveridge."
After waiting for an administration-backed conservation
bill to be passed, the Senate on June 16 finally voted on the
Beveridge amendments to the statehood bill. The vote closely
followed party lines, Democrats preferring the original measure, but the amended version was accepted. Now the views
of the two houses had to be reconciled. The President had
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been reported to favor the House version and Representative
Hamilton felt confident of support when he called upon the
President a day later to discuss the matter. But to Hamilton's
amazement and chagrin he was told that the Senate measure
was preferred and that the House should accede.
Therefore, on June 18,1910, the lower house unanimously
accepted the Senate version. The long document was taken
to the President on June 20 where in the presence of Senator
Beveridge, the territorial delegates, and other prominent
figures, Taft affixed his signature to the enabling act. "Rejoice together in the new day that is borned unto us," trumpeted the territorial Melrose Enterprise in response.
In complying with her enabling act, New Mexico's first
duty was to hold a constitutional convention. An attempt for
a nonpartisan convention failed because the Republicans, as
the dominant party, refused to enter into any such agreement
with the Democratic central committee. The lack of cooperation between the two major parties only aggravated the fundamental problems faced by citizens of the Southwest. New
Mexico and Arizona, as the last continental territories to be
admitted to the Union, were soon to become a battleground
for the great issues of the Progressive Movement, particularly direct legislation in the form of initiative, referendum,
and recall. While Harvey Fergusson, a Democrat swept by
the mood of the times, led the fight for progressive reform in
New Mexico, the Republican party apparently preferred to
remain noncommittal on many of the key political and social
issues. According to the party platfor~ of Dona Ana County,
the questions of "initiative and referendum, statewide prohibition or local option" were to be left to the vote of the people,
not written into the constitution.
Republicans had dominated New Mexico since the turn
of the century, and it was no surprise when more than twothirds of the delegates present for the convention opening
on October 3 were Republicans. A number of familiar faces
were in evidence at the Santa Fe meeting: the aging Catron;
Solomon Luna, chief representative of the native element;
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and Fergusson, leader of the so-called "irreconcilables" who
demanded a "thoroughly progressive constitution." Other
prominent leaders included Bursum, Fall, Charles A. Spiess,
Charles Springer, and Jose Sena.
Thirty-two lawyers comprising the largest occupational
group, reflected the leading role played by tough frontier
lawyers. Because law and land had long been associated in
New Mexico, one delegate was prompted to remark that the
land grant clique was the most powerful special interest
group at the convention. There also was a sizeable delegation
of Spanish-speaking people. This group had an understandable concern for the welfare of traditional native customs
and culture.
Republicans were assured control of the convention on the
third day when a 26-member Committee on Committees was
formed with Solomon Luna as chairman. This group established 27 lesser committees assigned to draft the various sections· of the constitution. Each committee had a Republican
chairman and majority to ensure the enactment of favorable
provisions.
Although the Republican majority looked with askance
at the comparatively new and untried instruments of direct
legislation, they dared not give too negative a response to the
most popular issues of the day. Consequently the convention
drafted a watered down referendum measure and difficult
amending provision. Constitutional safeguards also were inserted to guarantee the rights of Spanish-speaking people.
Woman's suffrage and prohibition, the other two key issues,
failed because of Republican reluctance.
Control of corporate institutions and legislative apportionment were hotly contested issues. The progressives
wanted monopoly regulation and restrictions on Big Business. But Holm Bursum, chairman of the Corporation Committee, was opposed to any measure which might discourage
corporations from coming into the new state. The result was
the establishment of a weak corporation commission, limited
in power to function.
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The controversy over legislative apportionment took its
traditional American form. A "Gerrymandering" operation
was so effectively employed by the Republican majority that
although the Democrats in the first state election elected the
governor and one of their candidates to Congress, the Republicans achieved a two-thirds majority in both the senate and
house of the state legislature.
January 21,1911, was set by New Mexico's governor, William J. Mills, as the date of ratification for the constitution.
The Democrats drew up a list of objections to the conservative constitution at Santa Fe on December 19, 1910, but did
not bind party members to vote against it. It thus remained
for individuals to carryon the fight against ratification. Harvey Fergusson was foremost in the battle, continually challenging the lack of one sincerely progressive measure. He
described the amendment article as 'difficult and improbable"
and the referendum measure as "mere make believe."
But the constitution had many defenders. Newspapers
commended the convention for having drafted a worthy document, and the threat that statehood would be delayed if the
constitution were not approved was effectively employed. As
expected, it was ratified by a vote of 31,742 to 13,309.
New Mexicans considered their conservative constitution
a likely candidate for approval despite the Democratic victory in the congressional election of 1910. At the time the
constitution was completed, a "lame duck" Republican Congress was still in session, and a President known to be conservative was in the White House. But New Mexico had not
reckoned with the effect of Arizona's newly framed and very
liberal constitution. It contained measures for initiative, referendum, and recall, and a child labor provision. Most controversial, however, was a provision for the recall of judges.
Many prominent politicians felt that these radical ideas could
only lead to a breakdown of American government, but Arizonans did have one important figure on their side; Theodore
Roosevelt gave the new document his wholehearted support.
Despite the raging controversy over Arizona's constitu-
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tion, President Taft did approve New Mexico's effort, and the
constitution was sent to Congress for approval on March 1.
A reluctant Beveridge was forced to let the document leave
his committee and be reported on the floor of the Senate. At
this point, Senator Robert Owen, a Democrat from Oklahoma,
objected to passing the resolution until it included approval
of the controversial Arizona constitution. A lengthy filibuster
by Owen finally moved the worried President to tell Owen
that an extraordinary session of Congress would be called
immediately after the close of the 61st Congress. Owens·
ended his filibuster but New Mexico had to wait until the
extra session. A disappointed and embittered Fall saw partisan politics in Owens' action. "Naturally, the Democrats
want Arizona admitted along with New Mexico, as the latter
will probably send two Republican senators and the former
two Democrats."
At the extra session of Congress a series of hearings were
held on the merits of New Mexico's constitution, which forced
the territory to air its dirty linen in public. Opponents such
as Fergusson· and J. D. Hand, Democrats; and Hagerman
and Richard Hanna, insurgent Republicans, were on hand
to criticize the new document. Former Senator Henry W.
Blair of New Hampshire was there to repeat a charge made
earlier by prohibition groups that the ratification election
was crooked. Eventually the House agreed on the Flood Resolution, a provision that New Mexico should vote on an easier
amending procedure at the first state election, while Arizona
would vote on eliminating the recall of judges, the outcome
of each vote to have no bearing on admission.
In the upper house Senator Nelson offered an amendment
which would have made it mandatory that Arizona give up
her recall of judges provision before admission. Despite real
concern for a free and independent judiciary as expressed by
such influential men as Elihu Root and William Borah, the
Nelson resolution was defeated and the Flood resolution
accepted.
Taft could not in accord with his conscience have accepted
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the Flood Resolution which would have allowed Arizona to
retain her provision for recall of judges. Referring to the
recall in his veto message he declared: "This provision of the
Arizona constitution, in its application to county and state
judges, seems so pernicious in its effect, so destructive of independence in the judiciary, . . . that I must disapprove a
constitution containing it." .The reaction was explosive. New
Mexicans, because their statehood hopes were dashed too by
the veto, were bitter. An "act of wanton, without reason,
without justification and without precedent" screamed the
Roosevelt County Herald.
There was talk in Congress of overriding the presidential
veto, but cooler heads prevailed. Senator William Alden
Smith, new chairman of the Senate territorial committee,
presented a resolution which would amend the Flood measure
by requiring that the recall clause be eliminated from the Arizona constitution before admission-such action to be voted
upon by the people of the territory. New Mexico would still
vote on an easier amending clause, but be admitted regardless
of the outcome of the vote. This compromise resolution was
approved by the Senate the following day 53 to 9. The House
adopted the resolution unanimously. At 3 :08 p.m., August
21,1911, President Taft signed the resolution admitting New
Mexico and Arizona into the Union. New Mexicans were
overjoyed as evidenced by the statehood meetings held
throughout the territory.
November 7, 1911, was the date set in New Mexico for
election of governor, two representatives to Congress, members of the first state legislature, and a host of county and
state officers. New Mexicans would also vote on a simpler
amending procedure whereby any change could be proposed
by a simple majority in each legislative house, and be ratified
by a majority at the "next election after adjournment," or
in a special election. Amendment ballots would be separate
and "printed on paper of the blue tint, so that they might be
readily distinguishable from the white ballots provided for
the election of county and state officers. . . ." Because of the
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color specification this amendment became known as the
"Blue Ballot" amendment.
Writing William Jennings Bryan, Fergusson was deeply
concerned over the approaching election. "As a willing tool
of corruptionists long in control here, the governor called the
election for November 7, the shortest time possible. They
know their machine is all ready with abundance of moneythat we are without money or effective organization." The
letter concluded with an urgent plea for money.
Fergusson's belief that money could do the trick was not
without substantial basis. Republicans were sharply divided
and events of the next few months were to show how severe
the split was. Bursum's selection as gubernatorial candidate
met with bitter opposition, and the choice of Curry as candidate for one of the two House seats did not satisfy all the
delegates. While Elfego Baca, the other choice, endorsed the
stand taken by the convention against the Blue Ballot amendment, Curry told convention members that condemnation of
the Blue Ballot was a mistake.
It was announced October 2 at the Democratic meeting
in Santa Fe that a group of "Independent Republicans"
headed by former Governor Hagerman and Hanna would
join the Democrats in- forming a fusion ticket. They were
given two spots on the ticket while top jobs went to leading
Democrats. William C. McDonald was nominated for Governor and Fergusson and Paz Valverde were selected as candidates for the national House of Representatives.
The combination of "Independent Republicans" and Democrats was strong enough to defeat Bursum and also elect
Fergusson to the House. Curry was elected because he refused to campaign against the Blue Ballot amendment which
was carried by a vote of 34,897 to 22,831. The apportionment
provision of the constitution saved the day for Republicans
who won handily in the legislative races.
The election of New Mexico's first two senators had been
delegated to the newly-elected legislature scheduled to convene in the spring. These two posts were regarded as rightful
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prizes by some of the territory's most vigorous statehood
proponents. Andrews, Catron, Fall, and Governor Mills were
considered top contenders. By all odds Andrews should have
secured one of these seats. As delegate to Congress when the
enabling act was achieved he had increased his popularity
with the people. He had the support of powerful eastern
financial interests as well as influetnial men in Congress.
Senator Boise Penrose, heir to Quay as political boss of Pennsylvania, had assured Taft in the presence of Andrews that
he would support the Delegate's political aspirations.
In September, 1911, apparently sensing a lack of support
for his candidacy among Republican leaders of the territory,
Andrews came out for a direct primary in electing senators.
But his aspirations were doomed to failure. Although Mills
was not an active candidate, Fall and Catron were, and two
shrewder, more formidable opponents could not be found.
The actual account of how Catron and Fall won the two
senate seats is a confused one. One report states that Andrews nobly withdrew his candidacy during a secret meeting
attended by Luna, Bursum, Catron, and others. This version
fails to account for Andrews' bitterness following the selection of Catron and Fall. He, along with Governor McDonald
and the Albuquerque Journal Democrat, questioned the legality of Fall's election. Apparently 17 members of the House
joined the Senate in electing Fall the night before the joint
assembly ratified the action. This procedure caused an uproar
but Fall in stubbornness continued in public life destined for
a career which in all respects was sensational.
According to another report submitted by the Burn's Detective Agency, four Spanish-speaking legislators, all supporters of Andrews, were lured into the old Palace Hotel in
Santa Fe by Elfego Baca, where they were arrested for allegedly trying to sell their votes. The four were forced to
resign their offices and jailed. A request by the sergeant-atarms that they be released was ignored for 18 hours, although
the four were later exonerated of charges preferred against.
them and declared entitled to their seats. The conclusion of
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this report was that the whole incident was a frame-up initiated by Baca, Spiess, Sena, Springer, Llewellyn, and Bursum to advance the candidacy of Fall, who would be assured
of victory if the four were removed.
Statehood had, however, been safely achieved before
Catron and Fall were elected senators. Arizona had complied
with the wishes of the President by eliminating the recall
provision, at least until she had been admitted as a state. On
January 5, while crowds gathered in Santa Fe to hear the
eagerly awaited news that Taft was signing the proclamation
of statehood, the last delay occurred. The Department of Justice wanted the signing of the statehood proclamation delayed until it could dismiss some of the actions taken in the
old timber cases. Taft was very displeased at this and his
irritation caused the Justice Department to dismiss the cases
immediately.
On.January 6,1912, a delegation including Andrews and
the two congressmen-elect from New Mexico witnessed the
signing which occurred at 1 :35 p.m. Taft then turned and
smilingly said: "Well, it's allover. I'm glad to give you life.
I hope you will be healthy." Arizona, so long associated with
New Mexico in the fight, was proclaimed a state on February
14, 1912. Consequently almost sixty-four years after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the sister territories
of the Southwest were brought into the Union.

